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Supreme Court Case to Clarify Rights of Noncitizen Criminal Defendants

2010-03-02T11:59:00.000-08:00

Provided by Ross & Pines, LLC

This past October, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Padilla v. Commonwealth of Kentucky. Padilla, a U.S. legal resident, but not a citizen, received a five-year prison sentence after pleading guilty to two misdemeanor drug-possession and one felony drug-trafficking charge before a Kentucky court in 2001. Pursuant to federal immigration law, Padilla was subject to mandatory deportation after finishing his prison term for committing an aggravated felony, even though he has lived legally in the U.S. for 40 years.

At issue in the Padilla case is whether it is considered ineffective assistance of counsel — a constitutional question of whether a criminal defense lawyer performs competently — if a criminal defendant's attorney misinforms him or her of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea. If a criminal defendant is able to successfully prove that his or her constitutional right to effective assistance of legal counsel was violated, the guilty plea will be thrown out. In Padilla, the defendant asked his court-appointed lawyer if pleading guilty would have any impact on his immigration status. The attorney told him that it would not because of the amount of time he had been living in the country — advice which turned out to be wrong.

Padilla appealed his conviction on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Kentucky Supreme Court, however, did not agree, holding that under the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, an attorney only has a duty to warn a client of the direct consequences of a guilty plea, and that mandatory deportation was a collateral, indirect consequence of the guilty plea.

Padilla then appealed his case to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Right to Counsel

The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to counsel. The right to counsel has been interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court to mean the right to the assistance ofeffective counsel so as to ensure a fair trial. When an attorney's conduct is deficient and prejudices the criminal defendant, the criminal defendant may claim ineffective assistance of counsel.

In Strickland v. Washington, the U.S. Supreme Court set out a two-prong test establishing the criteria that a defendant must prove to win an ineffective assistance of counsel claim:

The attorney's performance must have fallen below an objective standard of reasonableness
The criminal defendant must have been prejudiced by the attorney's deficient performance — i.e., there must be a reasonable probability that the result of the trial (or other legal proceeding) would have been different if the lawyer had performed adequately

If the criminal defendant can demonstrate both of these things, the guilty verdict will be overturned. However, demonstrating both of these things is usually quite difficult.

Padilla's Arguments Before the US Supreme Court

Padilla argued that the when the Kentucky Supreme Court ruled against him, the court misapplied thecollateral consequences rule. According to Padilla, this rule governs the court's duties when accepting a guilty plea, not an attorney's duties when representing a client.

Instead, the Strickland ineffective-assistance-of-counsel test should have guided the ruling in this case. Padilla contended that he met the two-prong Strickland standard because Padilla's lawyer performed deficiently, thereby prejudicing Padilla. Had Padilla known that he would be deported based on his guilty plea, he would have gone to trial instead of pleading guilty.

Further, Padilla maintained that even if the Kentucky Supreme Court did use the appropriate standard and this decision should turn instead upon whether deportation is a direct or collateral consequence of a conviction, the court was incorrect in deeming deportation a collateral consequence. For many immigrants, the threat of deportation is much more significant than any criminal punishment.

Finally, Padilla reasoned, even if the deportation is merely a collateral consequence, this particular case still must be analyzed as an ineffective-counsel issue under Strickland. Because Padilla's attorney specifically gave him incorrect information rather than simply not answering Padilla's immigration question, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should have been implicated and the Strickland test applied.

Commonwealth's Arguments Against Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In response, the Commonwealth of Kentucky argued that the Strickland test should not apply in Padilla's case because the Sixth Amendment does not entitle a defendant to legal advice from his or her criminal defense attorney regarding potential immigration consequences. The Sixth Amendment protections only reach advice about direct consequences of a conviction, not collateral consequences. The commonwealth alleged that deportation is a collateral consequence. In making this distinction, the prosecution pointed out that Commonwealth of Kentucky courts only have jurisdiction over the criminal charges, not over federal deportation matters.

Instead, the state contended that the court's only duty to Padilla was to ensure that his guilty plea was voluntary. A voluntary plea only requires that the defendant understand the direct consequences of his conviction. Accordingly, misunderstanding the consequences his plea would have on his immigration status was irrelevant, being merely a collateral consequence that would not have affected the voluntary nature of the plea.

Finally, the state claimed that if the Supreme Court finds in Padilla's favor, it will impose an impractical and overly burdensome duty on attorneys to inform criminal defendants of every possible collateral consequence of their guilty pleas.

Supreme Court Decision Expected in Late 2010

The Supreme Court will not issue its decision in Padilla until sometime later this year. During oral arguments, the justices not only appeared sympathetic to Padilla's plight, but also seemed concerned about broadening the scope of potential consequences from trial strategy decisions that an attorney must foresee and discuss with his or her client in order to satisfy the Sixth Amendment.

In the meantime, many noncitizen criminal defendants in the U.S. may find themselves in the same predicament as Jose Padilla. Immigration law is very complicated and attorneys who do not regularly practice in the field do not always understand it. For anyone who is concerned about the immigration consequences of a criminal charge, it is important to work with an attorney experienced in both criminal defense and immigration law.

Georgia Law Enforcement: Constitutional Restrictions on Vehicle Searches

2009-12-14T09:43:00.000-08:00

The public is rightfully grateful for strict enforcement of traffic and safety laws, but sometimes cops in Georgia go too far in searching the vehicles they stop.

Georgia Law Enforcement: Constitutional Restrictions on Vehicle Searches

Article provided by Ross & Pines, LLC.

Georgia is a beautiful place for a road trip. From piney forests to coastal islands and from rural farms to urban Atlanta, millions of vehicles traverse the state clocking billions of trip miles every year. In this time of a depressed economy and the resulting pressure on public funding, the Georgia State Patrol (GSP), sheriffs and local police departments have their hands full keeping everyone safe. The public is rightfully grateful for strict enforcement of traffic and safety laws, but sometimes cops in Georgia go too far in searching the vehicles they stop.

Vehicle Privacy Rights

The United States Constitution's Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures unless the authorities obtain valid judicial warrants based on probable cause. Federal and Georgia courts recognize that the constitutional right to privacy extends to your vehicle, although the privacy protection in your car is weaker than the right to privacy in your home.

Because cars are mobile and could drive away with important criminal evidence, and because they are highly regulated by the government, courts have held that in certain carefully defined circumstances police are not required to obtain warrants before searching motor vehicles. However, in Georgia police officers have abused these limited exceptions in order to conduct illegal searches of vehicles.

Search Incident to Arrest

The Supreme Court recognizes an exception to the warrant requirement in a search incident to a proper arrest. Basically the search-incident-to-arrest exception as articulated in Chimel v. California allows an officer to search the space within reach of the arrestee -- the area within his or her immediate control -- for either of two important reasons:

To prevent the suspect from obtaining a weapon that could harm the arresting officer
To prevent the arrestee from destroying or concealing evidence

In the 1981 case of New York v. Belton, the Supreme Court analyzed the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement when the person arrested is a driver or passenger of a motor vehicle. The Court looked at whether the lawful search in this circumstance extends to the passenger compartment of the car. The Court reasoned that because things --weapons or evidence -- in the passenger compartment could be grabbed by an arrestee and removed from the car, an officer making such an arrest could legally search the inside of the car, including the interior of a container found in the vehicle, without a warrant.

Arizona v. Gant

In April 2009, the US Supreme Court in Arizona v. Gant looked squarely at the Belton rule again, narrowing its reach and giving specific guidance to police about warrantless passenger compartment searches incident to arrest. Gant revisited the Chimel reasoning that an arresting officer could search the area within the immediate control of the arrestee to ensure that he or she could not reach a weapon or interfere with important evidence.

In Gant, the arrested person had been detained for driving with a suspended license, and was safely handcuffed and locked in the back of the squad car while the police searched his automobile without a warrant, finding an illegal drug in a coat in the backseat. Because an arrestee cuffed and locked in another car could not possibly reach into his own passenger compartment, the original reason for the exception to the warrant requirement - the safety of the officer and the preservation of evidence - had evaporated. The court also held that the only legitimate warrantless search in these circumstances is when there is reasonable suspicion of the existence of evidence of the crime for which the person is being arrested.

New Guidance for Police

Gant sends a clear message to Georgia cops and law enforcement across the US: no more "unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person's private effects." If you arrest someone for a traffic offense, you cannot search the car hoping to find drugs or other illegal contraband (unless another exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement exists). You may only reasonably look for evidence related to the traffic offense for which you are arresting the car's occupant.

The decision also gives pointed guidance to Georgia judges. When a defendant has been arrested on a traffic stop, did the cops search the car even after the defendant was removed from physical proximity to the car and could no longer have reached inside the passenger compartment? Was it reasonable for the police to believe the inside of the car could have contained evidence of that traffic offense?

Protect Your Rights

If you were stopped by Georgia law enforcement for a traffic violation and the officer either searched your car after cuffing and removing you from reach of the passenger compartment, or searched the inside of the automobile when there was no reasonable chance of evidence relevant to the traffic violation, that search may have been an unconstitutional violation of your Fourth Amendment rights as interpreted in Gant. Any evidence seized illegally should not be used against you at trial for a drug charge or any other criminal charge.

Be sure to consult with a knowledgeable Georgia criminal defense attorney as soon as possible if you believe you were the victim of an illegal vehicle search. To protect your rights and your liberty, time may be of the essence.

Georgia Supreme Court Issues Just Result in Sexual Assault Case

2009-12-14T09:37:00.000-08:00

Georgia Supreme Court Issues Just Result in Sexual Assault Case

Provided by Ross & Pines, LLC; Atlanta Sex Crime Defense Lawyers

A recent ruling by the Georgia Supreme Court underscores the necessity that the state legislature uses the upmost care in drafting state laws. Even though the court reached the correct conclusion in this case, the decision would not have been necessary if the law had been properly constructed at the outset.

Chase v The State

In Chase v. The State, the high court was asked to consider consent as a valid defense to a charge of sexual assault of a student by a teacher under O.C.G.A. §16-6-5.1(b). In the case, the student, Christy Elaine Garcia, was a 16-year-old junior attending Harlem High School in Harlem, Georgia. She admitted to pursuing a romantic relationship with a teacher at the school, 28-year-old Melissa Lee Chase. Chase was not Garcia's teacher at the time of the incident. The two did develop a relationship with one another and had one incidence of sexual contact.

Although Garcia's father and stepmother, with whom she lived, had knowledge of the relationship and allowed Garcia to stay with Chase, Garcia's mother did not know about it. After finding a note from Chase to Garcia with romantic overtures, Garcia's mother reported it to the police. The police then charged Chase with sexual assault for her illegal sexual contact with a student.

At trial, Chase claimed the charges should be dismissed because the relationship was consensual. However, the trial court disagreed, interpreting the language of O.C.G.A. §16-6-5.1(c)(3) to invalidate consent as a defense to the charges. Consequently, Chase was sentenced to 10 years in prison and 5 years probation and was required to register as a convicted sex offender.

On appeal, the appellate court upheld the finding by the trial court, again interpreting the language of the statute to prevent Chase from bringing a valid consent defense. Chase appealed the case to the Georgia Supreme Court.

Sexual Assault: O.C.G.A. §16-6-5.1

The statute at the heart of the debate in the Chase case has four subsections:

Subsection "a" defines the terms in the statute
Subsection "b" makes it a crime for someone with supervisory or disciplinary authority
ver another to have sexual contact with them, including those who are in a student-teacher relationship
Subsection "c" defines sexual assault for those with supervisory or disciplinary authority over someone in legal custody or detained in a hospital or other institution
Subsection "d" applies to sexual assault committed by those who work in long-term care, nursing homes, home health care and hospices against the patients

Importantly, only subsection c has language that explicitly says that consent is not an accepted defense to the crime, stating: "consent of the victim shall not be a defense to a prosecution under this subsection" (emphasis added) (O.C.G.A. §16-6-5.1(c)(B)(3)).

The Georgia Supreme Court's Decision

In reversing the decisions by the trial and appellate courts, the Georgia Supreme Court stressed the importance of reading the statute in accordance with the plain language of the law. After considering the statutory language, the court concluded that the explicit removal of consent as a defense to the law only applied to subsection c (those with authority over legal or hospital detainees) and not to the other subsections of the statute.

The court also stated that the statute must be read in harmony with Georgia's other laws, including the age of consent law. In Georgia, the legal age of consent for sexual contact is currently 16, meaning that anyone age 16 or older can enter into a consensual sexual relationship. Thus, state law only prohibits sexual contact with minors who are age 15 or younger.

In accordance with Georgia's consent law, the court reasoned that it would produce an illogical and unjust result if consent was removed as a defense to the other subsections of O.C.G.A. §16-6-5.1. If there was no consent defense, then the age of the parties would not matter and only the status as a teacher and student who had sexual contact would be necessary to convict under this law - a law which carries a 10-30 year prison sentence.

Accordingly, a professor could be convicted for having sexual relations with a consenting adult graduate student who was 30 years old. It is difficult if not impossible to make a persuasive argument that the legislature intended such an absurd result.

Thus, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the lower court decisions and ruled that consent is in fact a valid defense to a charge of sexual assault under O.C.G.A. §16-6-5.1(b).

Conclusion

Although the court absolutely reached the right decision in Chase, one would shudder to think of the consequences if it had not. If the trial court's decision had been upheld, Chase would have lost 10 years of her life behind bars, spent another 5 on probation and then, to add further insult to injury, been forced to register as a sex offender in the state - all for engaging in a consensual sexual act.

The truth of the matter is that the court never should have had to decide a case like this one. Elected legislators need to take time to carefully consider the full implications of proposed legislation when they are drafting laws, especially when it comes to criminalizing and punishing certain behaviors. Certainly, had the Georgia Supreme Court ruled otherwise, Ms. Chase would not have been the only person in the state to be unfairly punished by an absurd law.